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 Constitutionalism is most often associated with law, or rather the rule of law. As a 
result, constitutionalism becomes an ideology of limits, the limits that law imposes on social 
and political life. This modern understanding derives in large part from the politics of the 
written constitution, where purposefully putting form to a political order and enacting that in 
a public way has become more widely accepted (McIlwain 2008 [1958]). For those interested 
in the relationship of constitutionalism to international affairs, this assumption means turning 
to international law as the location for an international or global constitutional order 
(Klabbers, Peters, Ulfstein 2009; Dunoff and Tracthman 2009). For others it means locating 
constitutionalism in international organizations such as the UN (Fassbender 2009).  
 But law and legalization are not the only dimensions of constitutionalism. To 
constitute means to create, to empower, to give life to institutional forms and structures. The 
strong emphasis on law throughout the literature on global constitutionalism, and 
constitutionalism more generally, tends to obscure the importance of power, particularly the 
constituent power at the basis of modern constitutional thought. This chapter explores the 
relationship between law and power through an engagement with the work of Nicholas Onuf. 
Onuf’s seminal work of international relations and law, World of Our Making (2013 [1989]) 
explores the nature of rules and laws in the construction of international affairs. It well 
deserves its status as one of the ur-texts of constructivism in international relations, for it 
helped frame many efforts to explore the nature of constructed political life through its 
engagement with the idea of a rule, drawing on social and linguistic philosophy to understand 
how rules construct and bind agents by means of heteronomy, the Kantian idea of being 
bound by rules that lack a formal enforcement mechanism. Onuf’s conclusions in World of 
Our Making arose, in part, from his engagements with international legal theory (Onuf 2008). 
His analysis of the sources of law, law making, enforcement and the intersection of social and 
legal theory in understanding the international legal order deserve greater attention, which in 
part this chapter is intended to provide.  
 In his published work, Onuf moved from questions of rule and law to a different, 
albeit related strand of work, that concerning republicanism. In 1998 he produced yet another 
ground breaking work, one that moved out of debates in constructivist IR theory and toward 
international political theory: The Republican Legacy in International Thought. 
Republicanism, like constitutionalism, has many trajectories, but Onuf explores an 
international republican ideal through an engagement with three key figures: Aristotle, Vattel, 
and Kant. Republicanism for Onuf echoes some of his earlier concerns, for as Aristotle 
famously said, to be political is to know how to rule and be ruled.  
 In between these moments of constructivism and republicanism, nestled quietly in the 
sphere of international legal theory, Onuf published an essay entitled ‘The Constitution of 
International Society’ (1994). The article, published in the then newly launched European 
Journal of International Law, was reprinted in The Republican Legacy in International 
Thought. In his collection of essays on international law, Onuf describes the origins of the 
essay as a bridge between his work in international relations and international law. It had a 
second purpose, though, which Onuf describes as an effort to correct a too strong emphasis 
on discourse which had led scholars to neglect ‘the structural properties of constitutions’ 
(Onuf 2008: 295). The move to the constitutional in Onuf’s work represents a transformation 
from a focus on rules and constructivism to a focus on republicanism and institutions. For it 
is a constitution that locates law within institutions and yet also constitutes a legal order that 
can construct those institutions. A constitution provides the bridge between rules and 
institutions.  
 But to move from rules to institutions requires something that remains unexplored in 
much of the literature on international and global constitutionalism. It is power that makes 
law and institutions possible, and it is power that provides the origin of a constitution at its 
moment of founding. The particular form of power in modern constitutionalism that provides 
this bridge is constituent power, also known as pouvoir constituant. The power of the people, 
the coming together of individuals who formally agree to reorganize themselves and 
consciously live under the rule of law can be found in multiple domestic settings. From the 
American and French revolutions to the Arab Spring, constituent power appears often on the 
nightly news. Yet there appears to be no such moment at the global level. Of course, the 
Occupy Movements that arose in response to the 2008 financial crisis might be one version of 
an emerging constituent power, though this and previous movements against global 
capitalism have failed to construct a new constitutional order.  Others might locate such 
constituent power in states coming together to constitute new institutions, such as the 
founding of the League of Nations or the United Nations. Yet others might see constituent 
moments in cosmopolitan driven ideals that manifest themselves in activist NGOs seeking to 
drive forward particular agendas in diverse legal and political realms.  
 Locating such constituent moments in the international is difficult, to be sure, but not 
impossible. I argue that finding and labelling such moments should perhaps be the next stage 
in the research agendas of constructivist and legal scholars around the world. In that vein, this 
chapter will seek to do two things: First, it will describe Onuf’s transition from rules and 
constructivism to rule and republicanism. In so doing, I will highlight the role that 
constitutionalism plays in Onuf’s ideas, focusing on the essay noted above. Second, I wish to 
see if the path revealed by Onuf’s brush clearing might lead us toward the neglected element 
of power and particularly constituent power in international affairs. To do this, I turn briefly 
to a different theorist of republicanism, Hannah Arendt, and explore how her arguments in 
On Revolution (1963) connect with Onuf and yet also supplement his understanding of 
power, constitutionalism, and change. Onuf has led us to down a path that demonstrates how 
the international can be constituted by rules and institutions. This chapter follows that path, 
but turns it toward a different kind of constitutionalism, one in which constituent power 
points toward moments of global constitutionalism.   
Onuf on Rules 
 Onuf is known to all scholars of International Relations for his seminal contribution to 
constructivism. In World of Our Making, he explored the nature of rules and rule. He argued 
that there is not an anarchic realm in the sense assumed by many IR scholars, but that 
scholars should be attending to the ways in which rules arise from linguistic conventions and 
categories..  
 The relevance of this work for what I want to argue concerns its formulation of the 
relationship between rules and laws. H.L.A. Hart provides one such link, famously arguing 
that rules become laws when secondary rules exist – those defining how primary rules are 
made. The interaction of the two types of rules creates something like a constitutional order 
(Hart 1994). In his discussion of Hart, Onuf hints at how he understands the relationship of 
law and constitutions. He recalls that Hart’s account sees international law as law because 
there is a form of secondary rules in the doctrine of sources. Yet, Onuf then cites an article he 
wrote some years earlier as part of a project on global law making. In that article, reprinted in 
his collection of legal essays, he argues that the idea that there exists a clearly defined body 
of sources for international law, enumerated in Article 38 of the treaty establishing the 
International Court of Justice, is logically paradoxical. He notes, for instance, that the source 
of treaties might be better understood as a source founded in the legal idea of pacta sunt 
servanda, or agreements must be kept. But, if this is a customary idea, what is its foundation? 
And does this relate to the supposed hierarchy of sources in positivist international legal 
theory? Rather than the standard list of sources, he suggests that there might be others, such 
as resolutions from the General Assembly (GA). He points to the Sixth Committee of the GA, 
which is tasked with the development of international law, as a location where global law 
making might actually take place. In a parenthetical note on the reprinted version from 2008, 
Onuf notes ‘Looking back, I can see how naïve my hopes were’ (Onuf 2008a [1974]: 97). 
This disillusionment with the ability of international law to be truly ‘made’ perhaps explains 
the line in World of Our Making, where he says: ‘Better to say that the international order is 
legal to a degree that it would not be if it were to resemble a constitutional order' (Onuf 1989: 
138).   
 In the 1974 analysis of global law making, Onuf suggests that there are three sources 
of a legal order: a social contract, consensus, or social imperative. Of these three, World of 
Our Making highlights the latter two as the most fruitful to explore as sources of the 
international legal order, for there has been no international or global social contract. As a 
result, World of Our Making is about how a kind of underlying consensus has produced the 
international order. Even more so, it is about how not just social imperative but, for want of a 
better world, a logos imperative creates our world. That is, it is the very nature of language 
and its construction of the world that creates our international legal and political order. The 
fact that we use language creates the fact that we have rules. And those rules are the 
foundation or the reality of law at the global level.  Because there is no real or even 
imaginary constitution at the global level, we are left with rules that we did not author but 
which exist because our words have created them. 
 Onuf’s wider legal writings also demonstrate how he came to see rules as the result 
of our language rather than our authorship. The first set of essays, roughly from the mid-
1960s through the early 1980s, engage with international legal theory as it existed in the 
American and European traditions. In another essay from this period, he addresses the 
question of reprisals, a traditional legal category to describe (and justify) the use of military 
force short of war (Onuf 2008b [1974b]). Rather than justify or explain reprisals in terms of 
natural right or natural law, Onuf re-envisions the practice as a form of ritual. He turns to 
anthropological scholarship as a way to see such activities through a cultural lens. In this 
essay, Onuf comes to the very edge of what is possible in positivist legal theory and pushes 
the boundaries of that theory into new regions. The next period in his legal scholarship 
demonstrates how he moved from reacting to positivist theory to transcending it. This body 
of work, which he calls ‘Social Theory and the Linguistic Turn’ finds him making the move 
to the figures and ideas that constitute the structure of World of Our Making. 
 As a result, along with figures such as Friedrich Kratocwhil (1989), Onuf pointed 
scholars to the function of rules in the conduct of international affairs. In so doing, he moved 
away from the concerns of realists and liberals alike, whose underlying assumptions were 
drawn from formal rule making, i.e. legal and constitutional theory. Because of the way that 
realists assumed politics and law related – i.e., that law arises from a formal deliberative 
political process leading to structures of authority and sanction that constrain individual 
interests – the lack of any law making or law enforcement mechanisms at the global level 
made the international system anarchic and incapable of being studied with the tools of 
domestic political theory (Wight 1964).  
 But in making the move away from law making, Onuf perhaps pointed constructivist 
theory down a path that did not envision a possible future in which a more formalized, or 
perhaps differently formalized, means of law making, law enforcement and judgement might 
be possible. For some, to even look in this direction is utopian, reflecting the late 19th and 
early 20th century efforts to turn liberal theory into institutions and codes that would recreate 
the British political and legal order writ larger (or French, or German, or Dutch, depending on 
the colonial starting point). The constructivist literature that draws from Onuf tends to focus 
on this first part of World or Our Making where law results from rules that result from the 
logos imperative. 
 But Onuf did not write a book just about rules. The second half of the book, and 
indeed, much that followed, focuses on rule.  
Onuf on Rule  
 The bulk of the second half of World of Our Making is devoted to how rules relate to 
the practice of ruling or how we govern ourselves. The focus of this part is on the Kantian 
idea of heteronomy, which sits between (or perhaps alongside of) the two traditional poles of 
political theory, hierarchy and anarchy. Onuf explores how heteronomy can conceptualize a 
form of rule that is not structured in the same way as a domestic political order and yet does 
not collapse into anarchy.  
 The argument here also resists relying on the dominant political science approach to 
questions of rule, i.e., power. Onuf notes that too many scholars deploy the term with little or 
no precision and so he declares that he will not use it. I return to this move below, but at this 
stage in his argument it helps him develop the idea of heteronomy and its relationship to 
ruling that is the focus of the book. Yet, as the book comes to its conclusion, Onuf circles 
round to a conclusion that parallels the realism from which he seeks to distance himself. This 
is not the realism of power politics or the state and its national interests. Instead, it is the 
pessimism of classical realism, one inflected through Marxism, which leads him to the 
following final thoughts: 
In my view, rule is exploitative. If there are three categories of rule, then there are 
three forms of exploitation. If rule is inevitable – a position I think follows from 
the logic of rules and rule – then so is exploitation. The mitigation of exploitation 
in one form compels or promotes its presence in some other form…. There is no 
solution to the human reality of exploitation. Onuf 1989: 288-289 
 
This conclusion is surprising, both in light of what preceded it and in light of the way that 
constructivist scholarship tends to avoid the pessimism found in most classical realism. This 
is not to say Onuf is incorrect here, only that the formulation of this position stands counter to 
the potential of a heteronomy that might have enabled a different form of rule, which by its 
social necessity would mean it reflected social needs and perhaps even social values. Instead, 
on connecting his conception of rules and rule with a discussion of rationality and resources 
(the focus of the concluding chapter) we are left with an Onuf who sounds like a combination 
of Marx, Morgenthau and perhaps Niebuhr (without Christian salvation to temper him).  
 Onuf’s reflections on rule did not end with this book, of course. The next step in his 
intellectual trajectory saw the development of a theory of republicanism. This shift began 
soon after World of Our Making, saw a foray into the founding period of the American 
republic and came to its fruition in his international political theory work, The Republican 
Legacy in International Thought (1998). Onuf’s republicanism is both an inheritance of the 
ancients and also, as with all his work, a significant reworking of that inheritance. His 
republicanism builds on J.G.A. Pocock’s account, especially in the influence of the 
republicanism of Aristotle and Machiavelli on the American Founders (Pocock 1975). But he 
notes that Pocock’s republicanism fails to connect it to the international, which Onuf does by 
engaging the work of the 18th century diplomat and theorist of law, Emer de Vattel. Onuf 
develops an understanding of republicanism in both the domestic and the international that 
highlights a spatial dimension, leading him to focus on federalism in the American 
constitution and the civitas maxima of Christian Wolf, who provided the intellectual 
foundation on which Vattel developed his account. Vattel famously saw Europe as such a 
civitas, a city where virtue could flourish in accordance with the ancient ideals of Aristotle, 
Cicero and Machiavelli (Vattel 2008 [1758]). In that civitas, a kind of constitutional order 
emerges, one that allows large and small states to exist without threat to each other. It is an 
ideal composed of a whole (Europe) and parts (states).  
 The republican idea finds its way into Onuf’s two co-written historical studies of the 
American political order. In these works, written with his brother Peter Onuf – a historian of 
early America whose focus has been on Jefferson – Onuf develops an interesting 
understanding of the American constitution. In the first volume, Federal Union, Modern 
World (Onuf and Onuf 1993), they argue that there is a direct overlap between the ideas that 
constituted the early American republic and that constituting the European, and eventually 
international, political order. The next volume, Nations, Markets and War (Onuf and Onuf, 
2006) explores the intersection of this republican heritage with a modern, primarily liberal 
political discourse. This discourse they locate in Adam Smith, whose theorizations of the 
domestic and international realms contributes to the contractarian liberal order in which the 
market distributes wealth and in which we as individuals become consumers and participants 
in a market as opposed to citizens contributing to a defined political order. Again, the 
argument circles around a spatial set of relationships, the relation of the whole and the parts 
which constitutes Onuf’s conception of the republican heritage of Aristotle.  
 Let me come back to Onuf’s article, ‘The Constitution of International Society’ 
(1994). As noted above, this article appeared first in a journal (European Journal of 
International Law) then slightly revised in The Republican Legacy in International Thought 
(1998) and recently reprinted in his collected work of essays on legal theory (2008).1 The 
essay is oriented around four terms – theory, rules, constitution and society. The first theme, 
theory, will not be the focus of my attention here. Rather, I want to focus on the other three 
terms and what they tell us about Onuf’s understanding of constitutional and rule. Onuf 
                                                          
1 Onuf is also on the Board of the journal Global Constitutionalism, though of course this does not commit him 
to a belief in any particular understanding of this term. 
argues that rules constitute peoples and societies. This co-constitution process gives us our 
social and political reality at both the domestic and international levels. The first part of the 
essay speaks of this process not through a written constitution but through the social and 
political process that the Greeks, particularly Aristotle, would have called a constitution. That 
is, what Onuf describes first is closer to what Aristotle articulated in the Constitution of 
Athens – a descriptive account of how a social and political order comes to be through a 
focus on an array of institutional and rule based practices (Aristotle 1994). After reiterating 
some of his ideas about rules and their role in making political life, Onuf then turns again to 
the question of constitutions. In the latter part of the essay, he explores what he calls the 
‘material constitution’ (a term he draws from the legal theorist Hans Kelsen) or actual written 
constitutions that have come to be the defining feature of constitutionalism in the 20th 
century. He refers to the American constitution in the words of James Madison as something 
designed to ensure that the rules cannot be changed: ‘The constitution’s rules must be 
formally articulated so as to make their status apparent, even if they are not included in a 
particular document materially identified as the constitution’ (Onuf 1994: 14). He then points 
to the fact that there is a material constitution in the international realm, the UN Charter. He 
explores the nature of this material constitution, highlighting how Chapter 1of the Charter is 
the locus of a material constitution. For it is here, as Onuf argues, the Charter clarifies who 
‘counts’ as a legitimate agent in the system and gives those agents general responsibilities in 
how they are to act. He focuses on Article 2(4) the famous directive for all states to avoid the 
use of military force in their interactions with each other.  If the Charter and the material 
constitution of international society are based on the principle of peace, this fundamental 
Grundnorm (to use Kelsen’s famous idea) structures the international legal and constitutional 
order. 
 Onuf concludes the essay by noting that his focus on rules and society can result in a 
sort of conservatism, for it does not allow for the possibility of change. He suggests instead 
that change can come about in five ways: cumulative, legal, constitutional, revolutionary, and 
transformative. The first is sociological, describing the way a social system evolves through 
changes to its rules. The second is through legislation, a process that does not exist in a 
clearly defined way in the international legal order. The third comes from constitutions 
themselves, especially when they describe the amendment process. The fourth comes when 
‘self-empowered agents… dispose of the old constitution and introduce a new set of 
secondary rules reflecting a new distribution of power’ (Onuf 1994: 19). And, finally, 
transformative change is when a larger, more constitutive set of changes take place, ones that 
redefine agents and order in more profound ways than the other four.  
 I want to focus more carefully on this process of change, particularly on the political 
dimension of that change. In the next section, I ask whether or not revolutionary or 
transformative change is possible in the international legal order and, crucially, what role 
power plays in this process of change.  
The Power to Change 
 Onuf argues that transformative change is the most important, and, admittedly, the 
most difficult. He also notes that constitutional change is something that takes place through 
the structures and frameworks of the material constitution, i.e., through an amendment 
process. In the remainder of this essay, I want to move from Onuf and discuss the idea of 
revolutionary change, for it is in revolutionary change that the concept of power becomes 
most relevant. Understanding how revolutionary change can take place at the international 
level is complicated however. While there is a well-developed body of thought on how 
domestic revolutionary change takes place, there is less understanding of how such change 
takes place at the global level. So, in this last section, I want to suggest this potential by 
exploring the idea of constituent power and seeing how it might serve to locate a place for 
power in global affairs that sees it as an enabling concept rather than a destructive one. In 
order to do that, I begin with Aristotle and move to Arendt.  
 Aristotle, on whom Onuf relies for his understanding of republicanism, explores the 
nature of ruling in the Politics. Onuf draws from Aristotle a spatial conception of ruling 
which is connected to the ideas of federalism found in both the American constitution and 
Vattel’s ideas about the European political order. This insight allows Onuf to develop his 
argument that ruling should be understood through the spatial relations of parts and wholes. 
This links Onuf’s republican thought via Aristotle to the international where formal, material 
constitutions are not as evident but spatial relations of sovereignty and balance of power are 
more so. 
 Aristotle did not just provide a theorization of spatial relations. His work provides 
proposals for how to avoid revolution, especially in Book V. Aristotle explains what causes 
revolution across all the types he identifies. As such, there are extended discussions with 
historical examples of how tyrants, democrats, oligarchs, aristocrats, and monarchs can avoid 
revolution. The causes that Aristotle identifies can be reduced to three: inequality, fear, and 
contempt. These causes can be countered through various methods, though in the best 
constitutional order the construction of greater equality prevents revolution. His discussion of 
revolution comes to a close with a critique of his teacher, Plato. He argues that Plato’s 
Republic assumes that there will always be revolutions. In response, Aristotle argues that 
Plato’s cyclical understanding of revolutionary politics imposes a fictional construct on what 
the specificities of different constitutional orders and what leads individuals to seek to 
overthrow them (Aristotle 1994: 151-152). 
 Like Onuf, Aristotle describes and analyses the systems that he finds in the world in 
which he lives. He constructs a theory that will demonstrate how to avoid change. Onuf is 
less conservative than Aristotle on this point, as his international legal work demonstrates. 
Rather than conservatism, what Onuf takes from Aristotle here is a resistance to looking at 
the ways in which revolutions might be necessary and good for the state and for the human 
person. At times, political orders must be overturned. For Aristotle, such change should be 
avoided in order to ensure a stable political system, even if that system is a tyrannical one. 
Indeed, parts of Book V sound like Machiavelli’s efforts to describe how princes can keep 
their power rather than critically assessing how to create more just political systems. Again, 
this conservatism is not Onuf’s, but it perhaps explains the reasons why revolutionary change 
plays a limited role in his understanding of the constitution of international society.  
 Onuf, along with his brother, did explore a revolutionary situation, that of the 
founding of the United States. But their account of this famous revolutionary moment 
strangely leaves out discussions of revolutionary politics. Instead, its focus is on the 
construction of a constitution after the revolution (Onuf and Onuf 1994). They argue that this 
constitutional order paralleled and found inspiration in the larger republican thinking 
emerging at this time, especially in Vattel’s formulations of balance of power and federal 
order. Power finds its way into Onuf’s account of constitutions, but largely in the form of 
separation and balance rather than enablement and creation. Once more, this allows him to 
explain an existing order, whether it be the American constitution or the international system. 
What it does not do is provide a means to explore how power can be used to create a new 
constitution.  
 Revolutions take place in domestic politics not in international politics. Indeed, the 
lack of revolutions might explain Onuf’s focus on transformative change rather than 
revolutionary change as the most important. Revolutionary change requires political agents 
who have both a claim against the existing order, the power to act together, and the material 
from which to create a new order. None of this appears in the international order, or at least it 
does not appear in any clearly defined form. To find the potential for revolutionary change, 
for political power as something more than power politics, we need to reinterpret 
international politics or at least some elements of the international. We need to see in 
practices and events the potential for a constituent power when it may not be immediately 
evident, or when it may not look like it does in a domestic political context.  
Some scholars have made this interpretive move, though it is somewhat nascent at this 
point (Niesen 2014, Thornhill 2012). In concluding this paper, I wish to make my own move 
toward the idea of constituent power by using the work of Hannah Arendt as a resource for 
locating revolutionary power and potential in the international order. The book that is most 
obvious here is On Revolution, Arendt’s account of the French and American revolutions 
(Arendt 1963).2 The book drew upon an idiosyncratic reading of those events to explore the 
relationship of political action and political institutions. It  has also been subject to criticisms, 
particularly on her ideas of representation and constituent power (Negri 2009, Wellmer 2000) 
and her historical account of the American founding (Disch 2011). Some of these critiques 
are based on misunderstandings of the text, while others fail to grasp the wider project in 
which she was engaged. Her account of revolution is best seen in relation to her argument 
about political action, which she develops in The Human Condition (1958). She privileges 
action above other modes of human existence, suggesting in a very Aristotelian way that 
engaging in political life brings out what is best in the human person.  Political action then 
creates the public sphere in which continued the human condition can be sustained.  
                                                          
2 Some of what follows here draws on Lang 2014. 
 Arendt moves from conceiving of political action as occurring within a web of human 
relations to action within a polis.  But political action, according to Arendt, cannot be 
confined within the walls of the polis.  Political action is similar to a miracle – something one 
cannot expect and cannot contain.  While the polis is an attempt to create a physical space for 
political action, action forces itself beyond those boundaries. In other words, Arendt leaves a 
space here for an international or better yet global political space, one not confined to a single 
community or territory but boundless in its energy and creative force.  
    The link between agency and the creation and functioning of political institutions is 
not fully developed in this work. The closest Arendt gets to how action results in institutions 
is where speaking and acting in public places us in a ‘web’ of relationships, a context that 
exists ‘between’ people: ‘Most action and speech is concerned with this in-between, which 
varies with each group of people, so that most words and deeds are about some worldly 
objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent’ (Arendt 
1958: 182). The elusive character of Arendt’s notion of political action in this text results not 
from her inability to theorize about institutions, as we shall see below. Rather, it results from 
her effort to reclaim the importance of political action and to prevent such actions becoming 
ossified into skeletons that can never change. For one of the most important aspects of 
political action for Arendt is its creative force, its ability to allow humans to begin new 
things. This ‘natality’ as she calls it defines the human condition in the political realm. 
 Based on this account of political action, Arendt found in revolution a concept that 
highlights the potential of an active political life, one that reflects the essential natality of the 
political. Arendt proceeds to redefine revolution, starting with Machiavelli as the ‘spiritual 
founder of revolution’ (Arendt 1963: 37). Arendt privileges the Machiavelli of the Discourses 
rather than of the Prince, for she highlights his understanding of revolution as an act of 
founding.  She argues that political thought moved from Machiavelli’s focus on the ruler to a 
change in the whole political order.  The modern meaning of the term  finds its origins in 
Copernicus’ idea of the revolution of the planets (Arendt 1963: 42). This connected with 
emerging trends in natural law, particularly those accounts that looked to the natural world for 
insight into the human condition. The confluence of newly secularized natural law and the 
civil war in Britain shaped the meaning of revolution.  
 As Arendt highlights, the inevitability of the naturalist account underwent a subtle 
shift in the 18th century, particularly in the context of the French revolution. Its advocates no 
longer saw revolution as part of the nature of things, but as part of a historical progression, a 
new beginning that cannot be controlled. It moves from ‘the lawfulness of a rotating, cyclical 
movement to its irresistibility’ (Arendt 1963: 48-49). This new meaning intersects with 
historicist thinking in the 19th century, beginning with Hegel and continued by Marx. Their 
accounts found revolution to be part of a wider and longer historical process that left little 
room for the agency and natality of politics that Arendt highlighted in The Human Condition. 
Arendt argues the Hegelian and Marxian reading of the French Revolution is what shapes our 
understanding of the term, especially its valences of the inevitable and irresistible understood 
through the metaphors of ‘currents’, ‘streams’ and ‘rivers’. Human agency is lost and all we 
can do is sit as spectators watching the flow of history: ‘What the men of the Russian 
Revolution had learned from the French Revolution – and this learning constituted almost 
their entire preparation – was history and not action’ (Arendt 1963: 58). In linking revolution 
first to the natural philosophy of the 17th century and then the historicism of the late 18th and 
early 19th century, Arendt suggests that perhaps the very idea of revolution cannot escape a 
kind of determinism, something that is, in fact, antithetical to the type of political agency that 
was at the core of her ideas. In a sense, Arendt wishes to reclaim the meaning of revolution 
from these accounts, although it remains questionable the extent to her project can succeed as 
a result of the powerful influence these historicist readings have in our collective 
understanding of revolution.  
  
Arendt explores the French and American revolutions, concluding that the American 
one captured the centrality of the political which the French revolution failed to embody (a 
conclusion that has led to misreadings of her account). She turns to Thomas Paine, the most 
radical of the American founders, to highlight what made these revolutions moments so 
different and important: ‘A constitution is not the act of a government but of a people 
constituting a government’ (Arendt 1963: 145). But what differentiated the American and 
French revolutions can be seen in the influence Montesquieu on the Americans, for it was 
Montesquieu’s ideas that enabled the Americans to combine freedom and power by 
recognizing the need to limit the institutions of government. Rather than rely on law alone to 
check power, Montesquieu understood that ‘Power can only be stopped and still be kept intact 
by power’ (Arendt 1963: 151). Montesquieu and the American founders were not only 
interested in limiting power, a point misunderstood by libertarians and free market interpreters 
of the American experience. 
Here Arendt finds a link with Onuf (or the Onufs, perhaps) when she highlights the 
importance of seeing constitutions and the creation of constitutions as the result of the 
republican tradition. In this book, more than any other, Arendt mirrors the republicanism that 
Onuf develops both in his studies of the American experience and in his reflections on the 
republican heritage in international relations. Arendt here can supplement Onuf by bringing 
forth the moment of founding, that revolutionary experience that plays such a crucial role in 
constitutional politics. And, like Onuf, she wishes to find how rule is made possible in 
republican constitutions.  
Arendt argues that the power, the constituent power of the revolutionary moment, 
played very different roles in the ideas and practices of the French and American revolutions. 
In France, constituent power was seen to be the source of the law and constitutions; as such, 
its fluid and unstable nature resulted in constituent assemblies and constituents riven by 
conflict, resulting in instability throughout the 19th and even 20th centuries. The American 
experience, on the other hand, did not rely on constituent power to found its legal foundation, 
at least according to Arendt. Instead, the American founders drew on the idea of covenanting 
which they derived from the charters and common law traditions of England which they 
brought with them to found their order. Arendt argues that this heritage of common law and 
legal traditions gave the American experience something more worldly and stable upon which 
to found their constitutional order (Arendt 1963: 157).  
Once more, we can find a link with Onuf. For Onuf, the centrality of the customary 
legal order as part of the material constitution of international society is built upon a historical 
tradition. The invocation of rulings by the ICJ and other judicial and political orders remains a 
crucial stabilizing influence when the international system undergoes any kind of change. 
Even the creation of new institutions such as the International Criminal Court or the United 
Nations draws upon ideas underlying treaties and traditional international legal processes. 
While the tradition of thought that Arendt finds in the American Revolution differs from that 
found underlying the material constitution of the international, there is a parallel in the 
importance of a historical grounding for both forms of change to lead to stable outcomes.  
Arendt reads into the American experience a republican tradition. The American 
founders’ reliance on the charters of the 17th century and the covenants of the Pilgrims 
reinforces these foundational elements, drawing on Ancient Israelite traditions rather than 
simply Classical ones. Their respect for the authority of tradition gives the American 
experience something that the French, with their desire to sweep away all vestiges of the old 
order, failed to capture. Yet the American experience should not be confined to the authority 
of tradition, for Arendt reminds us that it was still a revolution, a break with the established 
order. It is the dialectic between the history of the tradition and the natality of the act of 
revolution that is at the core of Arendt’s account of the American experience. 
In the final chapter she suggests that there is a ‘lost treasure’ in the revolutionary 
tradition. The American founders sought to create permanence and durability in their 
institutions, which meant they failed to uphold the centrality of freedom and the force of 
political natality. When the founders moved to formalize the revolution in the creation of a 
constitution, they failed to leave space for the ‘townships and the town-hall meetings, the 
original springs of all political activity in the country’ (Arendt 1963: 239). In seeking to create 
national institutions through a constitutional assembly, the spirit of political action that had 
motivated the revolution in the first place was lost. Here Arendt turns back to the French 
Revolution’s critique of representation.  
 In an interview from 1970, Arendt moves from her historical focus on the French and 
American revolutions to an assessment of the student movements of the 1960s. She begins by 
arguing that the movements reinforce one of her core claims – that public political protest 
demonstrates brings about a kind of public happiness (Arendt 1972: 202). After mildly 
critiquing the student movement for its turn toward universities rather than keeping focused 
on public political affairs, Arendt makes a move that helps us see her relevance for the 
international. In the concluding discussion with the interviewer, she translates her arguments 
about the joy of revolutionary activity and the importance of council politics into a discussion 
of international politics. Here she suggests that a series of global protest movements, 
stretching across different national contexts might unite into a kind of federated structure, one 
that might retain a council ethos but somehow become international. This global federal 
structure could rely on local political councils, but no longer ones bound by the idea of 
sovereignty: 
In this direction, I see the possibility of forming a new concept of the state. 
A council state of this sort, to which the principle of sovereignty would be 
wholly alien, would be admirably suited to federations of the most various 
kinds, especially because in it power would be constituted horizontally and 
not vertically. But if you ask me now what prospects it has of being 
realized, then I must say to you: Very slight, if at all. And yet, perhaps, 
after all – in the wake of the next revolution. Arendt 1972: 233 
 
The potential for global political protest to emerge as a space of freedom and a way to capture 
the lost treasure of the revolution finds expression in this interview. As with the space left 
open for political action to turn global, this is not a carefully defined dimension of Arendt’s 
thought. But it is intriguing nonetheless.  
 Arendt points to something that theorists of revolutions and politics have failed to see. 
The protests from the late 1990s against the WTO, the Occupy movements of the last few 
years, and the revolutionary dynamics of the Arab Spring all point to the continued 
importance of a revolutionary spirit that transcends boundaries (Lang 2005, Lang 2014). Even 
though such movements are oriented toward state building goals at times, or are animated by 
the moralism that Arendt disdained, they reflect the inherent ‘joy’ in political action that she 
sought to capture. They are also global in scope, reflecting and refracting different visions of 
political life, combining in ways that might surprise us if we are locked into a traditional 
theory of revolution, one that relies on the traditional conception of constituent power. 
Instead, they represent efforts to create new modes of freedom, new spaces of liberty. They 
are ongoing efforts, not confined to a single moment or place. Arendt’s reflections on 
revolution may not be proved completely accurate, but it is undeniable that she brings forth a 
‘treasure’ that continues to be found by new generations of activists around the world.  
 Onuf wisely avoided the realist obsession with power. But power need not be 
understood through the framework of Hans Morgenthau. Rather, power can be seen through 
Arendt’s lens, an enabling action that brings together different figures and constituents into a 
new moment of action. Revolutionary moments need not happen just within single states, but 
can be regional, international or global. The constitution of international society does not just 
result from the shared rules that make international law and politics possible; perhaps it 
results as well from political action purposefully undertaken in the hopes of creating new 
realities. The work of theorists such as James Tully suggest a way forward here; attending to 
struggles for indigenous rights or environmental justice might lead to a new form of 
citizenship which while perhaps not global is at least closer to the globe than the state (Tully 
2008, Tully 2014).  
 This chapter should not be read as a critique of Onuf, although I realize I am 
highlighting a dimension of political life he has not explored to my liking. Rather, I see this as 
a chapter that is inspired by Onuf’s creative republicanism. My republicanism highlights 
revolutionary change, cross border citizenship and global constitutionalism. I could not have 
found these ideas or been able to locate them in the supposedly anarchic world of 
international relations without the intellectual world(s) made by Nicholas Onuf. 
  
 
